It is well known that, under certain conditions, it is possible to split logic programs under stable model semantics, that is, to divide such a program into a number of different "levels", such that the models of the entire program can be constructed by incrementally constructing models for each level. Similar results exist for other nonmonotonic formalisms, such as auto-epistemic logic and default logic. In this work, we present a general, algebraic splitting theory for logics with a fixpoint semantics. Together with the framework of approximation theory, a general fixpoint theory for arbitrary operators, this gives us a uniform and powerful way of deriving splitting results for each logic with a fixpoint semantics. We demonstrate the usefulness of these results, by generalizing existing results for logic programming, auto-epistemic logic and default logic.
INTRODUCTION
An important aspect of human reasoning is that it is often incremental in nature. When dealing with a complex domain, we tend to initially restrict ourselves to a small subset of all relevant concepts. Once these "basic" concepts have been figured out, we then build another, more "advanced", layer of concepts on this knowledge. A quite illustrative example of this can be found in most textbooks on computer networking. These typically present a seven-layered model of the way in which computers communicate. First, in the so-called physical layer, there is only talk of hardware and concepts such as wires, cables and • J. Vennekens et al. electronic pulses. Once these low-level issues have been dealt with, the resulting knowledge becomes a fixed base, upon which a new layer, the data-link layer, is built. This no longer considers wires and cables and so on, but rather talks about packages of information travelling from one computer to another. Once again, after the workings of this layer have been figured out, this information is "taken for granted" and becomes part of the foundation upon which a new layer is built. This process continues all the way up to a seventh layer, the application layer, and together all of these layers describe the operation of the entire system.
In this article, we investigate a formal equivalent of this method. More specifically, we address the question of whether a formal theory in some nonmonotonic language can be split into a number of different levels or strata, such that the formal semantics of the entire theory can be constructed by succesively constructing the semantics of the various strata. (We use the terms "stratification" and "splitting" interchangeably to denote a division into a number of different levels. This is a more general use of both these terms, than in literature such as Apt et al. [1988] and Gelfond [1987] .) Such stratifications are interesting from both a theoretical, knowledge representational and a more practical point of view.
On the more theoretical side, stratification results provide crucial insight into the formal and informal semantics of a language, and hence in its use for knowledge representation. Indeed, the human brain seems unsuited for holding large chunks of unstructured information. When the complexity of a domain increases, we rely on our ability to understand and describe parts of the domain and construct a description of the whole domain by composing the descriptions of its components. Large theories that cannot be understood as somehow being a composition of components, simply cannot be understood by humans. Stratification results are, therefore, important, especially in the context of nonmonotonic languages in which adding a new expression to a theory might affects the meaning of what was already represented. Our results will present cases where adding a new expression is guaranteed not to alter the meaning of existing theories.
On the more practical side, computing models of a theory by incrementally constructing models of each of its levels, might offer considerable computational gain. Indeed, suppose that, normally, it takes t(n) time to construct the model(s) of a theory of size n. If we were able to split such a theory into, say, m smaller theories of equal size n/m, we could use this stratification to compute the model(s) of the theory in m · t(n/m) time. As model generation is typically quite hard, that is, t(n) is a large function of n, this could provide quite a substantial improvement. Of course, much depends of the value of m. Indeed, in the worst case, the theory would allow only the trivial stratification in which the entire theory is a single level, that is, m = 1, which obviously does not lead to any gain. However, because (as argued above) human knowlegde tends to exhibit a more modular structure, we would expect real knowledge bases to be rather well behaved in this respect.
It is therefore not surprising that stratifiability and related concepts, such as, for example, Dix's notion of "modularity" [Dix 1995] , have already been intensively studied. It is therefore not surprising that this issue has already been intensively studied. Indeed, splitting results have been proven for autoepistemic logic under the semantics of expansions [Gelfond and Przymusinska 1992; Niemelä and Rintanen 1994] default logic under the semantics of extensions [Turner 1996 ] and various kinds of logic programs under the stable model semantics [Lifschitz and Turner 1994; Erdogan and Lifschitz 2004; Eiter et al. 1997] . In all of these works, stratification is seen as a syntactical property of a theory in a certain language under a certain formal semantics.
In this work, we take a different approach to studying this topic. The semantics of several (nonmonotonic) logics can be expressed through fixpoint characterizations in some lattice of semantic structures. We will study the stratification of these semantical operators themselves. As such, we are able to develop a general theory of stratification at an abstract, algebraic level and apply its results to each formalism which has a fixpoint semantics.
This approach is especially powerful when combined with the framework of approximation theory, a general fixpoint theory for arbitrary operators, which has already proved highly useful in the study of non-monotonic reasoning. It naturally captures, for instance, (most of) the common semantics of logic programming , auto-epistemic logic [Denecker et al. 2003 ] and default logic [Denecker et al. 2003 ]. As such, studying stratification within this framework, allows our abstract results to be directly and easily applicable to logic programming, auto-epistemic logic and default logic.
To make this a bit more concrete, we will now briefly sketch our method of derving splitting results. Approximation theory defines a family of different kinds of fixpoints of operators and shows that, using a suitable class of operators, these fixpoints correspond to a family of semantics for a number of different logics. We will introduce the concept of a stratifiable operator and prove that such operators can be split into a number of smaller component operators, in such a way that the different kinds of fixpoints of the original operator can be constructed by incrementally constructing the corresponding fixpoints of its component operators. These algebraic results will then be used to derive concrete splitting results for logic programming, auto-epistemic logic and default logic. To do this, we will follow these two steps:
-First, we have to determine syntactical conditions that suffice to ensure that every operator corresponding to a theory that satisfies these conditions, is in fact a stratifiable operator. This tells us that the models of such a theory under various semantics, that is, the various kinds of fixpoints of the associated operator, can be constructed by incrementally constructing the corresponding fixpoints of the components of this operator. -Second, we also need to provide a precise, computable characterization of the components of stratifiable operators. This will be done by presenting a syntactical method of deriving a number of smaller theories from the original theory and showing that the components of the original operator are precisely the operators associated with these new theories.
So, in other words, using the algebraic characterization of the semantics of a number of different logics by approximation theory, our algebraic results show how splitting can be done on a semantical level, and deriving concrete splitting results for a specific logic simply boils down to determining which syntactical notions correspond to our semantical splitting concepts.
Studying stratification at this more semantical level has three distinct advantages. First of all, it avoids duplication of effort, as the same algebraic theory takes care of stratification in logic programming, auto-epistemic logic, default logic and indeed any logic with a fixpoint semantics. Second, our results can be used to easily extend existing results to other (fixpoint) semantics of the aforementioned languages. Finally, our work also offers greater insight into the general principles underlying various known stratification results, as we are able to study this issue in itself, free of being restricted to a particular syntax or semantics.
This article is structured in the following way. In Section 2, some basic notions from lattice theory are introduced and a brief introduction to the main concepts of approximation theory is given. Section 3 is the main part of this work, in which we present our algebraic theory of stratifiable operators. In Section 4, we then show how these abstract results can be applied to logic programming, auto-epistemic logic and default logic, thus proving generalizations of existing results. Parts of this article have been published as Vennekens et al. [2004b] , which contains the results concerning logic programming, and Vennekens et al. [2004a] , which contains a shorter version of the results for auto-epistemic logic.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce some basic concepts that will be needed later on. Section 2.1 summarizes a number of well-known definitions and results from lattice theory, while Section 2.2 contains an overview of the framework of approximation theory.
Orders and Lattices
A binary relation ≤ on a set S is a partial order if it is reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric. An element x ∈ S is a central element if it is comparable to each other element of S, that is, x ≤ y or x ≥ y for each y ∈ S. For each subset R of S, an element l of S, such that l ≤ r for all r ∈ R is a lower bound of R. An element g in S such that g is a lower bound of R and for each other lower bound l of R, l ≤ g , is called the greatest lower bound, denoted glb(R), of R. Similarly, an element u such that for each r ∈ R, u ≥ r is an upper bound of R and if one such upper bound is less or equal to each other upper bound of R, it is the least upper bound lub(R) of R.
A partial order ≤ on a set S is well-founded if each nonempty subset R of S has a minimal element; it is total if every two elements x, y ∈ S are comparable, that is, x ≤ y or x ≥ y.
A pair L, ≤ is a lattice if ≤ is a partial order on a nonempty set L, such that each two elements x, y of L have a greatest lower bound glb(x, y) and a least upper bound lub (x, y) . A lattice L, ≤ is complete if each subset L of L has a greatest lower bound glb(L ) and least upper bound lub(L ). By definition, a complete lattice has a minimal (or bottom) element ⊥ and a maximal (or top) element . Often, we will not explicitely mention the partial order ≤ of a lattice L, ≤ and simply speak of the lattice L.
An operator is a function from a lattice to itself.
We denote the set of all fixpoint of O by fp (O) . A fixpoint x of L, such that for each other fixpoint y of L, x ≤ y, is the least fixpoint lfp(O) of O. It can be shown [Tarski 1955 ] that each monotone operator on a complete lattice has a unique least fixpoint.
Approximation Theory
Approximation theory is a general fixpoint theory for arbitrary operators, which generalizes ideas found in, among others, Baral and Subrahmanian [1991] , Ginsberg [1988] and Fitting [1991] . Our presentation of this theory is based on . However, we will introduce a slightly more general definition of approximation. For a comparison between approximation theory and related approaches, we refer to and Denecker et al. [2003] .
Let L, ≤ be a lattice. An element (x, y) of the square L 2 of the domain of such a lattice, can be seen as denoting an interval [ 
). An exact approximation is one which maps exact elements to exact elements, that is,
Similarly, a consistent approximation maps consistent elements to consistent elements, that is, if x ≤ y then
If an approximation is not consistent, it cannot approximate any operator. Each exact approximation is also consistent and approximates a unique operator O on L, namely that which maps each
. Each symmetric approximation is also exact.
For an approximation A on L 2 , the following two operators on L can be defined: the function Denecker et al. [ , 2003 , these fixpoints correspond to various semantics of logic programming, auto-epistemic logic and default logic.
Finally, it should be noted that the concept of an approximation as defined in corresponds to our definition of a symmetric approximation.
STRATIFICATION OF OPERATORS
In this section, we develop a theory of stratifiable operators. We will, in Section 3.2, investigate operators on a special kind of lattice, namely product lattices, which will be introduced in Section 3.1. In Section 3.3, we then return to approximation theory and discuss stratifiable approximations on product lattices. we will relate the results obtained for operators on product lattices to operators on other kinds of lattices.
Product Lattices
We begin by defining the notion of a product set, which is a generalization of the well-known concept of cartesian products.
Definition 3.1. Let I be a set, which we will call the index set of the product set, and for each i ∈ I , let S i be a set. The product set ⊗ i∈I S i is the following set of functions:
Intuitively, a product set ⊗ i∈I S i contains all ways of selecting one element from each set S i . As such, if the index set I is a set with n elements, for example, the set {1, . . . , n}, the product set ⊗ i∈I S i is simply (isomorphic to) the cartesian product S 1 × · · · × S n . Definition 3.2. Let I be a set and for each i ∈ I , let S i , ≤ i be a partially ordered set. The product order ≤ ⊗ on the set ⊗ i∈I S i is defined by ∀x, y ∈ ⊗ i∈I S i :
It can easily be shown that if all of the partially ordered sets S i are (complete) lattices, the product set ⊗ i∈I S i , together with its product order ≤ ⊗ , is also a (complete) lattice. We therefore refer to the pair ⊗ i∈I S i , ≤ ⊗ as the product lattice of lattices S i .
From now on, we will only consider product lattices with a well-founded index set, i.e. index sets I with a partial order such that each non-empty subset of I has a -minimal element. This will allow us to use inductive arguments in dealing with elements of product lattices. Most of our results, however, also hold for index sets with an arbitrary partial order; if a certain proof depends on the well-foundedness of I , we will always explicitely mention this.
In the next sections, the following notations will be used. For a function f : A → B and a subset A of A, we denote by f | A the restriction of f to A , i.e. f | A : A → B : a → f (a ). For an element x of a product lattice ⊗ i∈I L i and an i ∈ I , we abbreviate x| { j ∈I | j i} by x| i . We also use similar abbreviations x| ≺i , x| i and x| i . If i is a minimal element of the well-founded set I , x| ≺i is defined as the empty function. For each index i, the set {x| i | x ∈ L}, ordered by the appropriate restriction ≤ ⊗ | i of the product order, is also a lattice. Clearly, this sublattice of L is isomorphic to the product lattice ⊗ j i L i . We denote this sublattice by L| i and use a similar notation
If f , g are functions f : A → B, g : C → D and the domains A and C are disjoint, we denote by f g the function from A ∪ C to B ∪ D, such that for all a ∈ A, ( f g )(a) = f (a) and for all c ∈ C, ( f g )(c) = g (c). Furthermore, for any g whose domain is disjoint from the domain of f , we call f g an extension of f . For each element x of a product lattice L and each index i ∈ I , the extension x| ≺i x| i of x| ≺i is clearly equal to x| i . For ease of notation, we sometimes simply write x(i) instead of x| i in such expressions, that is, we identify an element a of the ith lattice L i with the function from {i} to L i which maps i to a. Similarly,
We will use the symbols x, y to denote elements of an entire product lattice L; a, b to denote elements of a single level L i and u, v to denote elements of L| ≺i .
Operators on Product Lattices
Let I, be a well-founded index set and let L = ⊗ i∈I L i be the product lattice of lattices L i , ≤ i i∈I . Intuitively, an operator O on L is stratifiable over the order , if the value (O(x))(i) of O(x) in the ith stratum only depends on values x( j ) for which j i. This is formalized in the following definition.
It is also possible to characterize stratifiablity in a more constructive manner. The following theorem shows that stratifiablity of an operator O on a product lattice L is equivalent to the existence of a family of operators on each lattice L i (one for each partial element u of L| ≺i ), which mimics the behavior of O on this lattice. 
PROOF. To prove the implication from left to right, let O be a stratifiable operator, i ∈ I and u ∈ L| ≺i . We define the operator
with y some element of L extending u a. Because of the stratifiability of O, this operator is well defined and it trivially satisfies the required condition.
To prove the other direction, suppose the right-hand side of the equivalence holds and let x, x be elements of L, such that
The operators O u i are called the components of O. Their existence allows us to already prove one of the main theorems of this article, which states that is possible to construct the fixpoints of a stratifiable operator in a bottom-up manner with respect to the well-founded order on the index set. If O is a monotone operator on a complete lattice, we are often interested in its least fixpoint. This can also be constructed by means of the least fixpoints of the components of O. Such a construction of course requires each component to actually have a least fixpoint as well. We will therefore first show that the components of a monotone operator are also monotone. 
. Now, we can prove that the least fixpoints of the components of a monotone stratifiable operator indeed form the least fixpoint of the operator itself. We will do this, by first proving the following, slightly more general theorem, which we will be able to reuse later on. ). Because of the well-foundedness of , y is well defined. Furthermore, y is clearly also a fixpoint of O. Therefore, x ≤ y and, by definition of the product order on L,
To prove the other direction, let x be an element of L, such that, for each i ∈ I , x(i) is the least fixpoint of P x| ≺i i . Now, let y be the least fixpoint of O. To prove that x = y, it suffices to show that for each i ∈ I , x| i = y| i . We will prove this by by induction on the well-founded order of I . If i is a minimal element of I , the proposition trivially holds. Now, let i be an index which is not the minimal element of I and assume that for each j ≺ i, x| j = y| j . It suffices to show that
As the induction hypothesis implies that x| ≺i = y| ≺i , y(i) is a also fixpoint of P x| ≺i i and therefore x(i) ≤ y(i). However, because x is also a fixpoint of O and therefore must be greater than the least fixpoint y of O, the definition of the product order on L implies that
It is worth noting that the condition that the order on I should be wellfounded is necessary for this proposition to hold. Indeed, consider for example the product lattice L = ⊗ z∈Z {0, 1}, with Z the integers ordered by their usual, non-well-founded order. Let O be the operator mapping each x ∈ L to the element y : Z → {0, 1} of L, which maps each z ∈ Z to 0 if x(z − 1) = 0 and to 1 otherwize. This operator is stratifiable over the order ≤ of Z and its components are the family of operators O u z , with z ∈ Z and u ∈ L| ≤z , which are defined as mapping both 0 and 1 to 0 if u(z − 1) = 0 and to 1 otherwize. Clearly, the bottom element ⊥ L of L, which maps each z ∈ Z to 0, is the least fixpoint of O. However, the element x ∈ L, which maps each z ∈ Z to 1, satisfies the condition that for each z ∈ Z, x(z) is the least fixpoint of P x| <z z , but is clearly not the least fixpoint of O.
Together with Theorem 3.5 and Proposition 3.6, this proposition of course implies that for each stratifiable
. In other words, the least fixpoint of a stratifiable operator can also be incrementally constructed.
Approximations on Product Lattices
In Section 2.2, we introduced several concepts from approximation theory, pointing out that we are mainly interested in studying Kripke-Kleene, stable and well-founded fixpoints of approximations. Similar to our treatment of general operators in the previous section, we will in this section investigate the relation between these various fixpoints of an approximation and its components. In doing so, it will be convenient to switch to an alternative representation of the bilattice L 2 of a product lattice L = ⊗ i∈I L i . Indeed, this bilattice is clearly isomorphic to the structure ⊗ i∈I L 2 i , i.e. to a product lattice of bilattices. From now on, we will not distinguish between these two representations. More specifically, when viewing A as a stratifiable operator, it will be convenient to consider its domain equal to ⊗ i∈I L 2 i , while when viewing A as an approximation, the representation (⊗ i∈I L i ) 2 is more natural. Obviously, this isomorphism and the results of the previous section already provide a way of constructing the Kripke-Kleene fixpoint of a stratifiable approximation A, by means of its components A u i . Also, it is clear that if A is both exact and stratifiable, the unique operator O approximated by A is stratifiable as well. Indeed, this is a trivial consequence of the fact that
These results leave only the stable and well-founded fixpoints of A to be investigated. We will first examine the operators A 1 (·, y) and A 2 (x, ·), and then move on to the lower and upper stable operators C ↓ A and C ↑ A , before finally getting to the partial stable operator C A itself.
PROPOSITION 3.8. Let L be a product lattice and let
Moreover, for each i ∈ I, u ∈ L| ≺i , the components of these operators are:
. From this, the two equalities follow.
In the previous section, we showed that the components of a monotone operator are monotone as well (Proposition 3.6). This result obviously implies that the components A 
PROOF. Let x, y be elements of L. Because A 1 (·, y) is stratifiable (Proposition 3.8), the corollary to Proposition 3.7 implies that
). Because of Proposition 3.8, this is in turn equivalent to for each i ∈ I ,
The proof of the second equivalence is similar.
This proposition shows how, for each x, y ∈ L, C ↓ A ( y) and C ↑ A (x) can be be constructed incrementally from the upper and lower stable operators corresponding to the components of A. This result also implies a similar property for the partial stable operator C A of an approximation A. PROPOSITION 3.10. Let L be a product lattice and let A : L 2 → L 2 be a stratifiable approximation. Then the operator C A is also stratifiable. Moreover, for each x, x , y, y ∈ L, the following equivalence holds:
PROOF. The above equivalence follows immediately from Proposition 3.9. To prove the stratifiability of C A , suppose that
It should be noted that the components (C A ) (u,v) i of the partial stable operator of a stratifiable approximation A are (in general) not equal to the partial stable operators C A
). Clearly, these two pairs are, in general, not equal, as (C
. We can, however, characterize the fixpoints of C A , that is, the partial stable fixpoints of A, by means of the partial stable fixpoints of the components of A.
. By Proposition 3.10, this is equivalent to for each
By Proposition 3.7, this theorem has the following corollary:
Putting all of this together, the main results of this section can be summarized as follows. If A is a stratifiable approximation on a product lattice L, then a pair (x, y) is a fixpoint, Kripke-Kleene fixpoint, stable fixpoint or wellfounded fixpoint of A iff for each i ∈ I , (x(i), y(i)) is a fixpoint, Kripke-Kleene fixpoint, stable fixpoint or well-founded fixpoint of the component A
of A. These characterizations give us a way of incrementally constructing each of these fixpoints.
Operators on Other Lattices
The theory developed in the previous sections allows us to incrementally construct fixpoints of operators on product lattices. However, not every operator is (isomorphic to) an operator on a (nontrivial) product lattice. For instance, as we will see in Section 4.2, the D T -operator of auto-epistemic logic is not. So, the question rises whether it is also possible to incrementally construct the fixpoints of an operator O on a lattice L, which is not a product lattice. Clearly, this could be done if the fixpoints of O were uniquely determined by the fixpoints of some other operatorÕ on a latticeL, whereL is a product lattice. Therefore, this section will investigate similarity conditions which suffice to ensure the existence of such a correspondence between the fixpoints fp(Õ) of an operatorÕ onL and those of an operator O on L. More precisely, we will determine a number of properties for a function k fromL to L, such that applying k to the fixpoints ofÕ yields the fixpoints of O. For a set S, function f : S → T and t ∈ T , we denote the set { f (s) | s ∈ S} by f (S) and the set {s ∈ S | f (s) = t} by f −1 (t). Using these notations, we can rephrase our goal as determining conditions that ensure that k
(fp(Õ)) = fp(O).
A natural condition to impose on such a function k fromL to L is that k •Õ should be equal to O • k.
PROPOSITION 3.13. LetL and L be lattices,Õ an operator onL and O an operator on L. If there exists a function k fromL to L, such that k
PROOF. LetL, L,Õ, O and k be as above. Letx ∈L be a fixpoint ofÕ. Then
This condition is, however, not strong enough to ensure that the reverse inclusion k(fp(Õ)) ⊇ fp(O) also holds. More precisely, there are two ways in which a fixpoint
First of all, k −1 (x) may be empty. Consider, for instance, the case in whichL is a one-element lattice {a} withÕ mapping a to a and L is a two-element lattice {b, c} with O mapping b to b and c to c. In this case, the function k mapping a to b satisfies the above condition, but k(fp(Õ)) clearly contains only b. 
is not empty, this set does not necessarily contain a fixpoint ofÕ. Consider, for instance, the case in whichL is a two-element lattice {a, b}, withÕ mapping a to b and b to a, and L a one-element lattice {c}, with O mapping c to itself. Then, the function k mapping both a and b to c satisfies the above condition, butÕ has no fixpoints.
To rule out such cases, we can make use of the fact that each k −1 (x) is closed under application ofÕ (Proposition 3.13). Let us first assume thatL is finite. In this case, situations in which, for some fixpoint x of O, k −1 (x) does not contain a fixpoint ofÕ can only occur ifÕ oscillates between some elements of k −1 (x). Therefore, it suffices for the operatorÕ to be monotone and for each k −1 (x) to contain at least one pairx andÕ(x) which are comparable. Indeed, under such conditions, each k −1 (x) will contain an elementc, such that successive applications ofÕ on thisc form a chain, that is, a totally ordered subset, of k −1 (x), which is guaranteed to reach a fixpoint.
PROPOSITION 3.15. LetL and L be lattices,Õ an operator onL and O an operator on L. If there exists a function k fromL to L, such that k
•Õ = O • k, O(L) ⊆ k(L) and -Õ is monotone, -each non-empty set k −1 (x), with x ∈ L,
has a central element (i.e., one which is comparable to all other elements of k
PROOF. LetL,Õ, L and O be as above. Let x be a fixpoint of O. It suffices to show the existence of a fixpoint ofÕ in k −1 (x). Because the set k −1 (x) is not empty (Proposition 3.14), it contains a central elementc. Because k −1 (x) is closed under application ofÕ (Proposition 3.13),Õ(c) is comparable toc. AsÕ is monotone, this implies that the elements (Õ n (c)) n∈N form a chain. Moreover, by induction on N, all these elements are clearly in k −1 (x). BecauseL is finite, there must be a m ∈ N, for whichÕ m (c) is a fixpoint ofÕ.
However, this still does not quite suffice for infinite lattice. Consider, for instance, the case in whichL is the complete lattice N ∪ {∞}, with the standard order on the natural numbers and ∞ = glb(N). LetÕ be the operator onL which maps ∞ to ∞ and each n ∈ N to n + 1. Let L be the two-element lattice {0, 1} and let O map 0 to 0 and 1 to 1. Then the function k which maps each • J. Vennekens et al. n ∈ N to 0 and ∞ to 1 satisfies all the above conditions and yet there is no fixpoint ofÕ in k −1 (0). As can be seen from this example, the problem is caused by the fact that (for infinite lattices) k −1 (x) being closed under application ofÕ, does not suffice to ensure that-for an ordinal α greater or equal to the ordinality ω of the natural numbers-the result O α (x) of applyingÕ α times to an elementx ∈ k −1 (x) will still be in k −1 (x). As, however, even for an infinite lattice, it is still the case that elements (Õ β (x)) β<α form a chain, this problem can never occur if k is chain continuous, that is, if for each chain ( 
Now, we finally have a set of properties, which suffices to ensure correspondence between the fixpoints ofÕ and those of O.
PROPOSITION 3.18. LetL and L be complete lattices,Õ an operator onL and O an operator on
PROOF. LetL,Õ, L and O be as above. Letc be the central element of k −1 (x). Once again, becauseÕ is monotone andc is a central element, for each ordinal α, the elements (O β (c)) β<α form a chain. As such, there must be an ordinal γ for whichÕ γ (c) is a fixpoint ofÕ. Therefore, it suffices to show that for each ordinal α,Õ α (c) ∈ k −1 (x). The fact that k −1 (x) is closed under application of O takes care of the case where α is a successor ordinal. If α is a limit ordinal, theñ
Because each pair of comparable elements ofL form a chain, chain continuity of k implies that k is also order-preserving. Therefore, we have the following result concerning the least fixpoints ofÕ and O. So far, we have shown that if a monotone operatorÕ k-mimics O, the fixpoints and the least fixpoint of O can be found by simply applying k to each fixpoint or, respectively, the least fixpoint ofÕ. Of course, this means that if an operator O can be mimicked by a stratifiable operatorÕ, we can incrementally construct the fixpoints and the least fixpoint of O, by means of the components ofÕ.
If the operator O is an approximation, however, we are also often also interested in its stable and well-founded fixpoints. The following proposition allows us to treat these in a similar way. PROOF. LetL, L,Ã, A, k, k be as above. We will show that C
As each partial stable operator C A is by definition monotone, this proposition shows that if an approximation A is k-mimicked by an approximationÃ, its stable and well-founded fixpoints can be found by simply applying k to the stable fixpoints or, respectively, the well-founded fixpoint ofÃ. Moreover, if A and A are exact and the unique operators approximated byÃ and A are monotone, the fixpoints and least fixpoint of the operator approximated by A can be found by applying k to the fixpoints or, respectively, the least fixpoint of the operator approximated byÃ.
Once again, this means that if an approximation A can be k-mimicked by a stratifiable approximationÃ, we can incrementally construct the stable and well-founded fixpoints of A, by means of the components ofÃ. Similarly, if an exact approximation A of a monotone operator O can be k-mimicked by a stratifiable exact approximationÃ of a monotone operatorÕ, we can incrementally construct the fixpoints and least fixpoint of O, by means of the components ofÃ.
APPLICATIONS
The general, algebraic framework of stratifiable operators developed in the previous section, allows us to easily and uniformly prove splitting theorems for logics with a fixpoint semantics. We will demonstrate this, by applying the previous results to logic programming (Section 4.1), auto-epistemic logic (Section 4.2) and default logic (Section 4.3).
As noted earlier, for each of these formalisms there exists a class of approximations, such that the various kinds of fixpoints of the approximation A T associated with a theory T correspond to the models of T under various semantics for this formalism.
In the case of logic programming, these approximations operate on a (lattice isomorphic to) product lattice. Therefore, it is possible to derive splitting results for logic programming by the following method: First, we need to identify syntactical conditions, such that for each logic program P satisfying these conditions, the corresponding approximation A P is stratifiable. Our results then show that the fixpoints, least fixpoint, stable fixpoints and well-founded fixpoint of such an approximation A P (which correspond to the models of P under various semantics for logic programming) can be incrementally constructed from the components of A P . Of course, in order for this result to be of any practical use, one also needs to be able to actually construct these components. Therefore, we will also present a procedure of deriving new programs P from the original program P , such that the approximations associated with these programs P are precisely those components.
For auto-epistemic logic and default logic the situation is, however, slightly more complicated, because the approximations which define the semantics of these formalism do not operate on a product lattice. Therefore, in these cases, we cannot simply follow the above procedure. Instead, we need to preform the additional step of first finding approximationsÃ T on a product lattice "similar" to the original lattice, which "mimic" the original approximations A T of theories T . The results of this section then show that the various kinds of fixpoints of A T can be found from the corresponding fixpoints ofÃ T . Therefore, we can split theories T by stratifying these new approximationsÃ T and, as theseÃ T are operators on a product lattice, this can be done by the above procedure. In other words, we then just need to determine syntactical conditions which suffice to ensure thatÃ T is stratifiable and present a way of constructing new theories T from T , such that the components ofÃ T correspond to approximations associated with these new theories.
Logic Programming
4.1.1 Syntax and Semantics. For simplicity, we will only deal with propositional logic programs. Let be an alphabet, that is, a collection of symbols that are called atoms. A literal is either an atom p or the negation ¬q of an atom q. A logic program is a set of clauses of the following form:
Here, h is a atom and the b i are literals. For such a clause r, we denote by head (r) the atom h and by body(r) the set {b 1 , . . . , b n } of literals. Logic programs can be interpreted in the lattice 2 , ⊆ , that is, the powerset of . This set of interpretations of is denoted by I . Following the framework of approximation theory, we will, however, interpret programs in the bilattice B = I 2 . In keeping with the intuitions presented in Section 2.2, for such a pair (X , Y ), the interpretation X can be seen as representing an underestimate of the set of true atoms, while Y represents an overestimate. Or, to put it another way, X contains all atoms that are certainly true, while Y contains atoms which are possibly true. These intuitions lead naturally to the following definition of the truth value of a propositional formula.
Definition 4.1. Let φ, ψ be propositional formula in an alphabet , a an atom of and let (X , Y ) ∈ B . We define
Note that to evaluate the negation of a formula ¬φ in a pair (X , Y ), we actually evaluate φ in (Y, X ). Indeed, the negation of a formula will be certain if the formula itself is not possible and vice-versa. Using this definition, we can now define the following operator on B .
Definition 4.2. Let P be a logic program with an alphabet . The operator T P on B is defined as:
with U P (X , Y ) = {p ∈ | ∃r ∈ P : head (r) = p, H (X ,Y ) (body(r)) = t}.
When restricted to consistent pairs of interpretation, this operator T P is the well known 3-valued Fitting operator [Fitting 1985 ]. In , T P is shown to be a symmetric approximation. Furthermore, it can be used to define most of the "popular" semantics for logic programs: the operator which maps an interpretation X to U P (X , X ) is the well known (two-valued) T Poperator [Lloyd 1987 ]; the partial stable operator of T P is the Gelfond-Lifschitz operator GL [Van Gelder et al. 1991] . Fixpoints of T P are supported models of P , the least fixpoint of T P is the Kripke-Kleene model of P , fixpoints of GL are (four-valued) stable models of P and its least fixpoint is the well-founded model of P . 4.1.2 Stratification. Our discussion of the stratification of logic programs will be based on the dependecies between atoms, which are expressed by a logic program. These induce the following partial order on the alphabet of the program.
Definition 4.3. Let P be a logic program with alphabet . The dependency order ≤ dep on is defined as: for all p, q ∈ : p ≤ dep q iff ∃r ∈ P : q = head (r), p ∈ body(r).
To illustrate this definition, consider the following small program:
The dependency order of this program can be graphically represented by the following picture:
In other words, r ≤ dep p, r ≤ dep q, p ≤ dep q, q ≤ dep p, s ≤ dep p and s ≤ dep q. Based on this dependency order, the concept of a splitting of the alphabet of a logic program can be defined. Definition 4.4. Let P be a logic program with alphabet . A splitting of P is a partition ( i ) i∈I of , such that the well-founded order on I agrees with the dependency order ≤ dep of P , that is, if p ≤ dep q, p ∈ i and q ∈ j , then i j .
For instance, the following partition is a splitting of the program E: 0 = {r}, 1 = {p, q} and 2 = {s} (with the index set I being the totally ordered set {0, 1, 2}).
If ( i ) i∈I is a partition of a logic program P with alphabet , the product lattice ⊗ i∈I 2 i is clearly isomorphic to the powerset 2 . We can therefore view the operator T P of such a program as being an operator on the bilattice of this product lattice, instead of on the original lattice B . Moreover, if such a partition is a splitting of a logic program P , the T P -operator on this product lattice is stratifiable. THEOREM 4.5. Let P be a logic program and let ( i ) i∈I be a splitting of this program. Then the operator T P on the bilattice of the product lattice ⊗ i∈I 2 i is stratifiable.
PROOF. Let j ∈ S and (
X , Y ), (X , Y ) ∈ B , such that X | i = X | i and Y | i = Y | i .
It suffices to show that for each clause with an atom from j in its head, H (X ,Y ) (body(c)) = H (X ,Y ) (body(c)). By Definition 4.4, this is trivially so.
By Theorem 3.11, this theorem implies that, for a stratifiable program P , it is possible to stratify the operators T P , T P and GL. In other words, it is possible to split logic programs with respect to the supported model, Kripke-Kleene, stable model and well-founded semantics. Moreover, the supported, Kripke-Kleene, stable and well-founded models of P can be computed from, respectively, the supported, Kripke-Kleene, stable and well-founded models of the components of the operator T P .
In order to be able to perform this construction in practice, however, we also need a more precise characterization of these components. We will now show how to construct new logic programs from the original program, such that these components correspond to an operator associated with these new programs. First, we will define the restriction of a program to a subset of its alphabet. Definition 4.6. Let P be a logic program with a splitting ( i ) i∈I . For each i ∈ I , the program P i consists of all clauses which have an atom from i in their head.
In the case of our example, the program E is partitioned in {E 0 , E 1 , E 2 } with E 0 = {}, E 1 = {p ← ¬q, ¬r. q ← ¬p, ¬r.} and E 2 = {s ← p, q.}.
If P has a splitting ( i ) i∈I , then clearly such a program P i contains, by definition, only atoms from j i j . When given a pair (U, V ) of interpretations of j ≺i j , we can therefore construct a program containing only atoms from i by replacing each other atom by its truth-value according to (U, V ). Definition 4.7. Let P be a logic program with a splitting ( i ) i∈I . For each i ∈ I and (U, V ) ∈ B | ≺i , we define P i (U, V ) as the new logic program P , which results from replacing each literal l whose atom is in j ≺i j by H (U,V ) ({l }).
Of course, one can further simplify such a program by removing all clauses containing f and just omitting all atoms t. Programs constructed in this way are now precisely those which characterize the components of the operator T P . THEOREM 4.8. Let P be a logic program with a splitting ( i ) i∈I . For each i ∈ I, (U, V ) ∈ B | ≺i and (A, B) ∈ B i :
PROOF. Let i, U, V , A and B be as above. Then because the order on I agrees with the dependency order of P , (T P )
We will show that A = T P i (U,V ) (A, B) ; the proof that B = T P i (V ,U ) (B, A) is similar. Let r be a clause of P , such that head (r) ∈ i . Then H (U A,V B) (body(r)) = t iff H (U,V ) (l ) = t for each literal l with an atom from j ≺i j ) and H (A, B) (l ) = t for each literal l with an atom from i . Because for each literal l with an atom from j ≺i j ), H (U,V ) (l ) = t precisely iff l was replaced by t in P i (U, V ) , this is in turn equivalent to H (A, B) (r (U, V ) ) = t (by r (U, V ) we denote the clause which replaces r in P i (U, V ) ).
It is worth noting that this theorem implies that a component (T P ) (U,V ) i
is, in contrast to the operator T P itself, not necessarily exact.
With this final theorem, we have all which is needed to incrementally compute the various fixpoints of the operator T P . We will illustrate this process by computing the well-founded model of our example program E. Recall that this program is partitioned into the programs E 0 = {}, E 1 = {p ← ¬q, ¬r. q ← ¬ p, ¬r.} and E 2 = {s ← p, q.}. The well-founded model of E 0 is ({}, {}). Replacing the atom r in E 1 by its truth-value according to this interpretation, yields the new program E 1 ({}, {}) = {p ← ¬q. q ← ¬p.}. The well-founded model of this program is ({}, { p, q}) . Replacing the atoms p and q in E 2 by their truth-value according to the pair of interpretations ({}, { p, q}), gives the new program E 2 = E 2 ({}, { p, q}) = {}. Replacing these by their truth-value according to the pair of interpretations ({ p, q}, {}), gives the new program E 2 = E 2 ({ p, q}, {}) = {s}. The well-founded fixpoint of (U E 2 , U E 2 ) is ({}, {s}). Therefore, the well-founded model of the entire program E is ({} ∪ {} ∪ {}, {} ∪ { p, q} ∪ {s}) = ({}, { p, q, s}).
Of course, it also possible to apply these results to more complicated programs. Consider for instance the following program in the natural numbers:
which can be seen as an abbreviation of the infitine propositional logic program:
even(0). odd(1) ← even(0).
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even(1) ← odd(0). odd(2) ← even(1). even(2) ← odd(1).
. . .
Clearly, the operator T Even is stratifiable with respect to the partition ({even(n), odd(n)}) n∈N
(using the standard order on the natural numbers) of the alphabet {even(n) | n ∈ N} ∪ {odd(n) | n ∈ N}. The component (T Even ) 0 of this operator corresponds to the program Even 0 = {even(0).}, which has {even(0)} as its only fixpoint. Let n ∈ N and U n = {even(i) | i < n, i is even} ∪ {odd(i) | i < n, i is odd}. Clearly, if n is even, the component (T Even ) (U n ,U n ) n corresponds to the program {even(n).}, while if n is odd (T Even ) (U n ,U n ) n corresponds to the program {odd(n).}. This proves that the supported, Kripke-Kleene, stable and well-founded models of the program Even all contain precisely those atoms even(n) for which n is an even natural number and those atoms odd(n) for which n is an odd natural number. Lifschitz and Turner [1994] proved a splitting theorem for logic programs under the stable model semantics; similar results were indepently obtained by Eiter et al. [1997] . In one respect, these results extend ours, in the sense that they apply to logic programs with an extended syntax, also called answer set programs, in which disjunction in the head of clauses is allowed and in which two kinds of negation (negation-as-failure and classical negation) can be used. While our results could easily be extended to incorporate the two negations, the extension to disjunction in the head is less straightforward. However, the fact that the stable model semantics for disjunctive logic programs can also be characterized as a fixpoint semantics [Leone et al. 1995] , seems to suggest that our approach could be used to obtain similar results for this extended syntax as well. In future work, we plan to investigate this further. Current work into extending approximation theory to also capture the semantics of this kind of programs [Pelov and Truszczynski 2004] , makes this possibility seem even more interesting.
Related Work.
In another respect, our results are more general than those of Lifschitz and Turner [1994] . When considering only programs in the syntax described here, our results generalize their results to include the supported model, KripkeKleene and well-founded semantics as well. This makes our results also applicable to extensions of logic programming which, unlike answer set programming, are not based on the stable model semantics. One example in the context of deductive databases is datalog which is based on well-founded semantics. Another example is the formalism of ID-logic Denecker and Ternovska 2004] . This is an extension of classical logic with non-monotonic inductive definitions, the semantics of which is given by the well-founded semantics. Our stratifiability results give insight in modularity and compositionality aspects in both logics.
While the results discussed above are, as far as we know, the ones most similar to ours, there are a number of other works which should be also be mentioned. Extending work from Verbaeten et al. [2000] , Denecker and Ternovska [2004] recently discussed a number of modularity results for the aforementioned ID-logic. The main difference with our work, is that these results are aimed at supporting syntactical transformations on a predicate level, whereas we have considered propositional progams.
In order to further motivate and explain the well-founded model semantics, Przymusinski [1998] defined the dynamic stratification of a program. The level of an atom in this stratificiation is based on the number of iterations it takes the Gelfond-Lifschitz operator to determine the truth-value of this atom.
1 As such, this stratification precisely mimics the computation of the well-founded model and is, therefore, the tightest possible stratification of a program under the wellfounded semantics. However, as there exist no syntactic criteria which can be used to determine whether a certain stratification is the dynamic stratification of a program-in fact, the only way of deciding this is by actually constructing the well-founded model of the program-this concept cannot be used to perform the kind of static, upfront splitting which is our goal.
Auto-Epistemic Logic
In this section, we will first describe the syntax of auto-epistemic logic and give a brief overview, based on Denecker et al. [2003] , of how a number of different semantics for this logic can be defined using concepts from approximation theory. Then, we will follow the previously outlined methodology to prove concrete splitting results for this logic.
Syntax and Semantics.
Let L be the language of propositional logic based on a set of atoms . Extending this language with a modal operator K , gives a language L K of modal propositional logic. An auto-epistemic theory is a set of fomulas in this language L K . For such a formula φ, the subset of containing all atoms which appear in φ, is denoted by At(φ); atoms which appear in φ at least once outside the scope of the model operator K are called objective atoms of φ and the set of all objective atoms of φ is denoted by At O (φ). A modal subformula is a formula of the form K (ψ), with ψ a formula.
To illustrate, consider the following example:
The objective atoms At O (φ 2 ) of φ 2 are {q}, while the atoms At(φ 2 ) are { p, q}.
An interpretation is a subset of the alphabet . The set of all interpretations of is denoted by I , that is, I = 2 . A possible world structure is a set of interpretations, that is, the set of all possible world structures W is defined as 2 I . Intuitively, a possible world structure sums up all "situations" that are possible. It therefore makes sense to order these according to inverse set inclusion to get a knowledge order ≤ k , that is, for two possible world stuctures Q, Q , Q ≤ k Q iff Q ⊇ Q . Indeed, if a possible world structure contains more possibilities, it actually contains less knowledge.
In case of the example, the following picture shows a part of the lattice W At(F ) :
Following Denecker et al.
[2003], we will define the semantics of an autoepistemic theory by an operator on the bilattice B = W 2 . An element (P, S) of B is known as a belief pair and is called consistent iff P ≤ k S. In a consistent belief pair (P, S), P can be viewed as describing what must certainly be known, that is, as giving an underestimate of what is known, while S can be viewed as denoting what might possibly be known, that is, as giving an overestimate. Based on this intuition, there are two ways of estimating the truth of modal formulas according to (P, S): we can either be conservative, that is, assume a formula is false unless we are sure it must be true, or we can be liberal, that is, assume it is true unless we are sure it must be false. To conservatively estimate the truth of a formula K φ according to (P, S), we simply have to check whether φ is surely known, that is, whether φ is known in the underestimate P . To conservatively estimate the truth of a formula ¬K φ, on the other hand, we need to determine whether φ is definitely unknown; this will be the case if φ cannot possibly be known, that is, if φ is not known in the overestimate S. The following definition extends these intuitions to reach a conservative estimate of the truth of arbitrary formulas. Note that the objective atoms of such a formula are simply interpreted by an interpretation X ∈ I . Definition 4.9. For each (P, S) ∈ B , X ∈ I , a ∈ and formulas φ, φ 1 and φ 2 , we inductively define H (P, S), X as: -H (P, S), X (a) = t iff a ∈ X for each atom a; -H (P, S), X (ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 ) = t, iff H (P, S), X (ϕ 1 ) = t and H (P, S), X (ϕ 2 ) = t; -H (P, S), X (ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 ) = t, iff H (P, S), X (ϕ 1 ) = t or H (P, S), X (ϕ 2 ) = t; -H (P, S), X (¬ϕ) = ¬H (S, P ), X (ϕ); -
It is worth noting that an evaluation H (Q, Q), X (φ), that is, one in which all that might possibly be known is also surely known, corresponds to the standard S 5 evaluation [Meyer and van der Hoek 1995] . Note also that the evaluation H (P, S), X (K φ) of a modal subformula K φ depends only on (P, S) and not on X . We sometimes emphasize this by writing H (P, S),· (K φ). Similarly, H (P, S), X (φ) of an objective formula φ depends only on X and we sometimes write H (·,·), X (φ).
As mentioned above, it is also possible to liberally estimate the truth of modal subformulas. Intuitively, we can do this by assuming that everything which might be known, is in fact known and that everything which might be unknown, that is, which is not surely known, is in fact unknown. As such, to liberally estimate the truth of a formula according to a pair (P, S), it suffices to treat S as though it were describing what we surely know and P as though it were describing what we might know. In others words, it suffices to simply switch the roles of P and S, that is, H (S, P ),· provides a liberal estimate of the truth of modal formulas.
These two ways of evaluating formulas can be used to derive a new, more precise belief pair (P , S ) from an original pair (P, S). First, we will focus on constructing the new overestimate S . As S needs to overestimate knowledge, it needs to contain as few interpretations as possible. This means that S should consist of only those interpretations, which manage to satisfy the theory even if the truth of its modal subformulas is underestimated. So, S = {X ∈ I | ∀φ ∈ T : H (P, S), X (φ) = t}. Conversly, to construct the new underestimate P , we need as many interpretations as possible. This means that P should contain all interpretations which satisfy the theory, when liberally evaluating its modal subformulas. So, P = {X ∈ I | ∀φ ∈ T : H (S, P ), X (φ) = t}. These intuitions motivate the following definition of the operator D T on B :
This operator is an approximation [Denecker et al. 2003 ]. Moreover, since
it is by definition symmetric and therefore approximates a unique operator on W , namely the operator D T [Moore 1984 ], which maps each Q to D u T (Q, Q). As shown in Denecker et al. [2003] , these operators define a family of semantics for a theory T : -fixpoints of D T are expansions of T [Moore 1984] , -fixpoints of D T are partial expansions of T [Denecker et al. 1998 ], -the least fixpoint of D T is the Kripke-Kleene fixpoint of T [Denecker et al. 1998 ], -fixpoints of C ↓ D T are extensions [Denecker et al. 2003 ] of T , -fixpoints of C D T are partial extensions [Denecker et al. 2003 ] of T , and -the least fixpoint of C D T is the well-founded model of T [Denecker et al. 2003 ].
These various dialects of auto-epistemic logic differ in their treatment of "ungrounded" expansions [Konolige 1987 ], that is, expansions which arize from cyclicities such as K p → p.
When calculating the models of a theory, it is often useful to split the calculation of D u T (P, S) into two separate steps: In a first step, we evaluate each modal subformula of T according to (P, S) and in a second step we then compute all models of the resulting propositional theory. To formalize this, we introduce the following notation: for each formula φ and (P, S) ∈ B , the formula φ P, S is inductively defined as:
For a theory T , we denote {φ P, S | φ ∈ T } by T P, S . Because clearly
it is the case that for each (P, S) ∈ B :
To illustrate, we will construct the Kripke-Kleene model of our example theory F = {p ∨ ¬K p; K ( p ∨ q) ∨ q}. This computation starts at the least precise element (I { p,q} , {}) of B { p,q} . We first construct the new underestimate D u F ({}, I { p,q} ). It is easy to see that
and
, we note that it is still the case that
is the least fixpoint of D F , that is, the Kripke-Kleene model of F . 4.2.2 Stratification. Let ( i ) i∈I be a partition of the alphabet , with I, a well-founded index set. For an interpretation X ∈ I , we denote the intersection X ∩ i by X | i . For a possible world structure Q, {X | i | X ∈ Q} is denoted by Q| i .
In the previous section, we defined the semantics of auto-epistemic logic in terms of an operator on the bilattice B = W 2 . However, for our purpose of stratifying auto-epistemic theories, we are interested in the bilatticeB of the product latticeW = ⊗ i∈I W i . An element of this product lattice consists of a number of possible interpretations for each level i . As such, if we choose for each i one of its interpretations, the union of these "chosen" interpretations interprets the entire alphabet . Therefore, the set of all possible ways of choosing one interpretation for each i , determines a set of possible interpretations for , that is, an element of W . More formally, we define:
Similary,B can be mapped to B by the function κ, which maps each (P ,S) ∈ B to (κ(P ), κ(S)).
This function κ is, however, not an isomorphism. Indeed, unlike W , elements ofW cannot express that an interpretation for a level i is possible in combination with a certain interpretation for another level j , but not with a different interpretation for j . For instance, if we split the alphabet { p, q} of our example F into 0 = {p} and 1 = {q}, the element {{ p, q}, {}} of W is not in κ(W ), because it expresses that { p} is only a possible interpretation for 0 when 1 is interpreted by {q} and not when 1 is interpreted by {}. To make this more precise, we introduce the following concept. Definition 4.10. A possible world structure Q ∈ W is disconnected with respect to a partition ( i ) i∈I of its alphabet iff for all possible worlds X , Y ∈ Q and for each i
PROOF. We will first prove the inclusion from left to right. LetQ be an element ofW and let X , Y be elements of κ(Q). Then, by the definition of κ, for each i ∈ I , there are elements
To prove the other direction, let Q be a disconnected element of W . LetQ be the following element ofW :
We now restrict our attention to a class of theories whose models are all disconnected.
Definition 4.12. An auto-epistemic theory T is stratifiable w.r.t. a partition ( i ) i∈I of its alphabet and a well-founded order on I , if there exists a partition {T i } i∈I of T such that for each i ∈ I and φ ∈ T i : At O (φ) ⊆ i and At(φ) ⊆ ∪ j i j .
To illustrate, our example theory F is stratifiable w.r.t. the partition 0 = { p}, 1 = {q} of its alphabet { p, q} and the corresponding partition of F is
Clearly, for a stratifiable theory, the evaluation H (P, S), X (φ) of a formula φ ∈ T i only depends on the value of (P, S) in strata j i and that of X in stratum i. PROPOSITION 4.13. Let T be a stratifiable auto-epistemic theory. Let i ∈ I and φ ∈ T i . Then for each (P, S), (P , S ) ∈ B and X , X ∈ I , such that X | i = X | i and P | ∪ j i j = P | ∪ j i j and S|
This proposition can now be used to show that only disconnected belief pairs are relevant for the operator D T .
PROPOSITION 4.14. Let T be a stratifiable auto-epistemic theory. Then each
This result suggests that the fact that κ is not surjective should not pose any problems, because we can simply forget about possible world structures of W that do not correspond to elements of our product latticeW . However, there is another difference between the latticesW and W , that needs to be taken into account. Indeed, besides not being surjective, κ is also not injective. Concretely, W contains multiple "copies" of the empty set, that is, for anyQ ∈W , as soon as for some i ∈ I ,Q(i) = {}, it is the case that κ(Q) = {}.
Let us introduce some notation and terminology. We call an possible world structure Q ∈ W consistent if Q = {}; the set of all consistent Q is denoted by W c . A belief pair (P, S) is called consistent if both P and S are consistent; the set of all consistent belief pairs is denoted B c . Similarly,Q ∈B is called consistent if κ(Q) = {} and the set of all consistentQ is denoted asW c . Finally, a belief pair (P ,S) is called consistent if both κ(P ) = {} and κ(S) = {} and we denote the set of all consistent pairs (P ,S) asB c . We will often need to eliminate inconsistent possible world structures from our considerations. Intuitively, the reason for this is that, when constructing a stratification, we need every stratum i to be completely independent of all strata j for which j i. However, if an inconsistency occurs at level j , then this could affect the way in which a lower level i is interpreted, because it will eliminate all possible worlds. Mathematically, this problem manifest itself by the fact that the equality κ(Q)| i = κ(Q| i ) only holds for consistent possible world structuresQ.
We now summarize some obvious properties of κ. (1) κ is order preserving; (2) κ is an embedding ofW c into W c and an isomorphism betweenW c and the set of all disconnected possible world structures in W c ;
Because of the differences between the latticesB and B outlined above, we cannot directly stratify the operator D T . Instead, we will define an intermediate operatorD T onB , which is stratifiable by construction and whose consistent fixpoints are related to consistent fixpoints of D T . We define this operatorD T in such a way that, for any belief pair (P ,S) ∈B , the ith level ofD T (P ,S) will be constructed using only the theory T i and the restriction (P ,S)| i of (P ,S).
Definition 4.16. Let T be a stratifiable auto-epistemic theory. Let (P ,S) be inB . We defineD u T (P ,S) =Q, with for each i ∈ I :
Observe that we could equivalently define the ith level ofD u T (P ,S) as the set Mod(T i κ(P | i ,S| i ) ) of models of the propositional theory
Let us now first show that, like its counterpart D T , this operator is also an approximation.
PROPOSITION 4.17. Let T be a stratifiable auto-epistemic theory. ThenD T is an approximation.
PROOF. Let (P ,S), (P ,S ) ∈B , such that (P ,S) ≤ p (P ,S ). Because then (S,P ) ≥ (S ,P ), we only need to show that Denecker et al. [2003] , we know this implies that for each φ of T i and X in
We can relate the consistent fixpoints ofD T to those of D T , using the following result.
PROOF. Let (P ,S) ∈B
c . By symmetry of the operatorsD T and D T , it suffices to show that κ(D u T (P ,S)) = D u T (κ(P ,S)). Because for i = j , the objective atoms of T i and T j are disjoint, it is a trivial property of propositional logic that Mod(T κ(P ,S) consists precisely of all worlds of the form ∪ i X i for which X i ∈ Mod(T i κ(P ), κ(S) ). Now, letQ be the element ofB that maps every i ∈ I to Mod(T i κ(P ), κ(S) ). We then have that
Because T i contains only modal literals in the alphabet ∪ j i j , we already have that
, which proves the result.
We already know that κ is an isomorphism betweenB c and the set of all consistent, disconnected belief pairs in B , and that all consistent fixpoints of D T are also disconnected. Therefore, the above Proposition 4.18 now directly implies the following result. A similar correspondence also holds for the consistent stable fixpoints of these two operators. Our proof of this depends on the following result. (S) can be constructed as the limit of, respectively, the ascending sequences (Q n ) 0≤n and (Q n ) 0≤n , defined as follows: Q 0 is the bottom element I of W and for every n > 0, Q n = D u T (Q n−1 , S); similarly,Q 0 is the bottom element ofW , that is, for all i ∈ I ,Q 0 (i) = I i , and for all n > 0,Q n =D u T (Q n−1 ,S). It suffices to show that, for all n ∈ N, Q n = κ(Q n ). We prove this by induction over n. For the base case, it is clear that κ(Q 0 ) = Q 0 . Now, suppose that the equality holds for n. Theñ Q n+1 =D u T (Q n ,S), which we must prove equal to Q n+1 = D u T (Q n , S). By the induction hypothesis, this last expression is equal to D u T (κ(Q n ), κ(S)). We distinguish two cases. First, let us assume thatQ n is consistent. By Proposition 4.18, it is then the case that κ(D u T (Q n ,S)) = D u T (κ(Q n ,S)), which is precisely what needs to be proven. Second, assume that κ(Q n ) = Q n = {}. BecauseQ n+1 ≥ kQ n and κ is order-preserving, κ(Q n+1 ) = {}. Moreover, because also Q n+1 ≥ k Q n = {}, we have that Q n+1 = {}, which means that, here too, we get the desired equality κ(Q n+1 ) = Q n+1 .
Together with the fact that κ is an isomorphism betweenW c and the set of all consistent, disconnected possible world structures, this result now directly implies the following correspondence between consistent stable fixpoints. PROPOSITION 4.21. The set of all κ(P ,S) for which (P ,S) is a consistent stable fixpoint ofD T is equal to the set of all consistent stable fixpoints ofD T .
We can now summarize the content of Propositions 4.19 and 4.21 in the following theorem. THEOREM 4.22. Let T be a stratifiable theory. The set of all κ(P ,S) for which (P ,S) is a consistent fixpoint (consistent stable fixpoint, respectively) ofD T is equal to the set of all (P, S), for which (P, S) is a consistent fixpoint (consistent stable fixpoint) of D T .
We now define a class of theories, for which (partial) expansions and (partial) extensions cannot be inconsistent.
Definition 4.23. An auto-epistemic theory T is permaconsistent if every propositional theory T that can be constructed from T by replacing all nonnested occurrences of modal literals by t or f is consistent.
Observe that, contrary to what the above definition might suggest, we do not actually need to check every assignment in order to determine whether a theory is permaconsistent. Indeed, it suffices to only consider the worst case assignment, in which every positive occurrence of a modal literal is replaced by f and every negative occurrence is replaced by t. Moreover, we can also check permaconsistency for every stratum separately, because, for a stratifiable theory T , T is permaconsistent iff for every i ∈ I , T i is permaconsistent.
Clearly, for a permaconsistent theory T , every belief pair in the image of D T orD T is consistent and, therefore, all fixpoints or stable fixpoints of these operators must be consistent as well. As such, Theorem 4.22 implies that the fixpoints and stable fixpoints of D T andD T coincide, which of course implies that also the least fixpoint and well-founded fixpoint of these two operators coincide. In summary, we obtain the following result. This property does not hold for theories that are not permaconsistent. We illustrate this by the following example. Let T be the theory {K p ⇐ p; ¬K ( p ∨ q)}. This T is stratifiable with respect to the partition 0 = {p}, 1 = {q}, with the corresponding partition of T being T 0 = {K p ⇐ p} and T 1 = {¬K ( p ∨ q)}. However, T is not permaconsistent, because, for instance, {t ⇐ p; ¬t} is not consistent. The operator D T now has as its Kripke-Kleene fixpoint the pair ({{ p, q}}, {}), as can be seen from the following computation:
The Kripke-Kleene fixpoint ofD T can be constructed as follows:
So, we find that applying κ to the Kripke-Kleene fixpoint ofD T yields ({{}, {q}}, {}), which is not equal to the Kripke-Kleene fixpoint (
Using the correspondences between consistent (stable) fixpoints ofD T and D T , we can now proceed to analyse T by looking atD T and moreover, becausẽ D T is by construction stratifiable, we can do so by applying our algebraic stratification results to this operator. Concretely, we can incrementally construct its (stable) fixpoints, using its component operators. Of course, for this result to be useful, we also need to know what these component operators actually are. It turns out that a component on level i corresponds to a theory, that can be constructed from T i , by replacing certain formulas by their truth value according to a belief pair (Ũ ,Ṽ ) ∈B | ≺i . Before showing this for all stratifiable theories, we first consider the following, more restricted class of theories. Definition 4.25. A theory T is modally separated w.r.t. to a partition ( i ) i∈I of its alphabet iff there exists a corresponding partition (T i ) i∈I of T , such that for each i ∈ I and φ ∈ T i
Clearly, all modally separated theories are stratifiable. The fact that each modal subformula of a level T i of a modally separated theory T contains either only atoms from i or only atoms from a strictly lower level, makes it easy to construct the components of itsD T -operator. Replacing all modal subformulae of a level T i which contain only atoms from a strictly lower level j ≺ i, by their truth-value according to a belief pair (Ũ ,Ṽ ) ∈ B | ≺i results in a "conservative theory" T c , while replacing these subformulae by their truth-value according to (Ṽ ,Ũ ) yields a "liberal theory"
To make this more precise, we inductively define the following transformation φ U, V i of a formula φ ∈ T i , given a belief pair (Ũ ,Ṽ ) ∈B | ≺i :
Note that this transformation φ Ũ ,Ṽ i is identical to the transformation φ P, S defined earlier, except for the fact that in this case, we only replace the underestimates and overestimates for 1 , that is, F l 1 liberally estimates the truth of K p, while F c 1 estimates it conservatively: ) on consistent belief pairs. Therefore, this component has a fixpoint ({{}, {q}}, {{q}}), as can be seen from the following equations:
Now, the set of all I ∪ J for which I ∈ {{}, { p}} and J ∈ {{}, {q}} is I { p,q} , while the set of all M ∪ N for which M ∈ {{p}} and N ∈ {{q}} is the singleton {{ p, q}}. We therefore conclude that the belief pair (I { p,q} , {{ p, q}}) is a consistent partial expansion of T .
So far, the above discussion has only considered partial expansions. We can of course also look at other semantics. Let us define a stratified partial extension of T i given (Ũ ,Ṽ ) as a stable fixpoint of the component (
. We also introduce the term stratified expansion (or stratified extension) to refer to aQ ∈W for which (Q,Q) is a stratified partial expansion (respectively, stratified partial extension). For permaconsistent theories, we can draw stronger conclusions. Let us call the least stratified partial expansion (respectively, least stratified partial extension) the stratified Kripke-Kleene model (stratified well-founded model). We then have the following result. 
Related Work.
In Gelfond and Przymusinska [1992] and Niemelä and Rintanen [1994] , it was shown that certain permaconsistent and modally separated auto-epistemic theories can be split under the semantics of expansions. We have both extended these results to other semantics for this logic and to a larger class of theories.
To give some intuition about the kind of theories our result can deal with, but previous work cannot, we will consider the following example (from Etherington [1988] ): Suppose we would like to express that we suspect a certain person of murder if we know he had a motive and if it is possible that this person is a suspect and that he is guilty. This naturally leads to following formula:
This formula is not modally separated w.r.t. the partition 0 = {guilty, motive}, 1 = {suspect} and, therefore, falls outside the scope of Gelfond et al.'s theorem. Our result, however, does cover this example and allows it to be split w.r.t. this partition. As we will discuss in the next section on default logic, there exists an important class of default expressions, called semi-normal defaults, which typically give rize to such statements. Konolige [1987] suggested a transformation m from default logic to autoepistemic logic, which was shown by Denecker et al. [2003] to capture the semantics of default logic. For simplicity, we will ignore the original formulation of the semantics of default logic and view this as being defined by the autoepistemic theory m(D, W ). A pair (P, S) of possible world structures is an expansion [Marek and Truszczynski 2004] , a partial expansion [Denecker et al. 2003 ], an extension [Reiter 1980 ], a partial extension [Denecker et al. 2003 ], the Kripke-Kleene model [Denecker et al. 2003 ] or the well-founded model [Baral and Subrahmanian 1991] By the results of the previous section, this now immediately implies the following result. . Because no such component theory can contain a nested occurrence of a modal literal, standard transformations for propositional logic can be used to bring each of its formulas into the form:
where the α i , β j and γ are all propositional formulas. Because K α 1 ∧ · · · ∧ K α m is equivalent to K (α 1 ∧· · ·∧α m ), this suffices to show that each such formula can be transformed back into a default. As such, it would be possible to reformulate the above theorem entirely in terms of default logic.
We now investigate a specific class of theories, for which it is particularly useful to restate our result in this manner. Let us call a default theory D, W modally separated if the auto-epistemic theory m(D, W ) is modally separated or, equivalently, if for every default d ∈ D i of form Eq. (1), it is the case that no formula φ ∈ {α, β 1 , . . . , β n } contains both an atom p ∈ i and q ∈ ∪ j ≺i j . Given a stratum D i , W i of such a theory and a belief pair (Ũ ,Ṽ ) ∈B | ≺i , we define D i Ũ ,Ṽ i as the set of defaults d that result from replacing, in every d ∈ D i , all formulas φ ∈ {α, β 1 , . . . , β n } whose atoms belong to alphabet ∪ j ≺i j , by their truth value according to (Ũ ,Ṽ ). Now, we can characterize the auto-epistemic component theory [T i ] Ũ ,Ṽ i as simply being m(D i Ũ ,Ṽ i , W i ). Therefore, Theorem 4.34 implies that a possible world structure P is a consistent extension of a stratifiable default theory D, W if and only if there exists aP such that κ(P ) = P and, for each i ∈ I ,P (i) is a consistent extension of the theory D i (P ,P )| ≺i i , W i . 4.3.3 Related Work. Turner [1996] proved splitting theorems for default logic, which considered only consistent extensions. We extend these results to the semantics of consistent partial extensions and consistent (partial) expansions. Moreover, his results only apply to modally separated default theories. Our results therefore not only generalize previous results to other semantics, but also to a larger class of theories.
A typical example of a default which is not modally separated but which can be split using our results, is the example from Etherington [1988] concerning murder suspects. This can be formalized by the following default:
motive : suspect ∧ guilty suspect .
In the previous section, we already presented the auto-epistemic formula resulting from applying the Konolige transformation to this default and showed that it was not modally separated w.r.t. the partition 0 = {guilty, motive}, 1 = {suspect}. Therefore, Turner's theorem does not apply in this case, but our results do.
Defaults such as these are typical examples of so-called semi-normal defaults, i.e. defaults of the form α : β γ where β implies γ . This typically occurs because there is some formula δ, such that β = γ ∧ δ. In such cases, the Konolige transformation will contain a formula K (¬γ ∨ ¬δ) and such defaults can therefore only be modally separated w.r.t. stratifications in which all atoms from both γ and δ belong to the same stratum. Our results, however, also allows stratifications in which (all or some) atoms from δ belong to a strictly lower stratum than the atoms from γ .
CONCLUSION
Stratification is, both theoretically and practically, an important concept in knowledge representation. We have studied this issue at a general, algebraic level by investigating stratification of operators and approximations (Section 3). This gave us a small but very useful set of theorems, which enabled us to easily and uniformly prove splitting results for all fixpoint semantics of logic programs, auto-epistemic logic and default logic (Section 4), thus generalizing existing results.
As such, the importance of the work presented here is threefold. Firstly, there are the concrete, applied results of Section 4 themselves. Secondly, there is the general, algebraic framework for the study of stratification, which can be applied to every formalism with a fixpoint semantics. Finally, on a more abstract level, our work also offers greater insight into the principles underlying various existing stratification results, as we are able to "look beyond" purely syntactical properties of a certain formalism.
